We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic equivalence, closedness (CLOS), the reduced game property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP) for suitably generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of all bounded faces of the positive core, is characterized similarly. Just RCP has to be replaced by a suitable weaker axiom, a weak version of CRGP (the converse RGP) has to be added, and CLOS can be deleted. For classical games the prenucleolus is the unique further solution that satisfies the axioms, but for games with precedence constraints it violates NE as well as the prekernel. The positive prekernel, however, is axiomatized by NE, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak RGP, CRGP, and weak unanimity for two-person games (WUTPG), and the bounded positive prekernel is axiomatized similarly by requiring WUTPG only for classical two-person games and adding BOUND.
appears to be of special interest since it corresponds by Birkhoff's theorem to a situation which is often encountered in practice: the presence of a hierarchy, or any kind of partial order , on the set of players N . In this case, feasible coalitions are those satisfying the following rule: if player i is present, then any of its subordinates j ≺ i must be present (this is called by Faigle and Kern "precedence constraints") .
Moreover, the set of feasible coalitions is closed under union and intersection. For these reasons, we precisely focus in this paper on this type of structure.
Considering that F is a distributive lattice induced by some partial order on N , the core of games on such structures has already deserved much attention, and many results valid for classical games have been extended to this case, in particular, the Shapley-Ichiishi theorem (Shapley 1971 , Ichiishi 1981 characterizing convex TU games Gilles 1995, Grabisch and . The essential difference with classical games is that a nonempty core is always (unless F = 2 N ) unbounded, however it is pointed. Extremal rays of the core have been found by Tomizawa (1983) , and bounded facets have been studied by Grabisch (2011) . The set of all bounded facets of the core, called the bounded core, has been studied and axiomatized by Grabisch and Sudhölter (2012) . From the interpretation point of view, it is the set of core elements for which any player takes the maximum from its subordinates.
Other solution concepts like the nucleolus, the kernel, etc. have been much less studied in the context of restricted cooperation. It is the main purpose of this paper to fill this gap for games with precedence constraints. Our first aim is to study the positive core (Orshan and Sudhölter 2010) , which is closely related to the prenucleolus. We find that the positive core can be axiomatized in a way which is very close to the classical case, up to a suitable generalization of the axioms, namely by non-emptiness (NE), reasonableness (REAS), covariance (COV), the reduced game property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP), nondiscrimination (ND), and closedness (CLOS), the latter permitting to eliminate the relative interior of the positive core as a candidate for the solution. The positive core being unbounded unless F = 2 N , we propose likewise the bounded positive core, which has the same intuitive interpretation as for the bounded core. We find that it can be axiomatized by NE, COV, RGP, RCP restricted to classical games, ND, boundedness (BOUND), and a variant of the converse reduced game property, called RCRGP.
The bounded positive core contains a particular point, which can be considered as the prenucleolus of the game, since it coincides with the usual prenucleolus when F = 2 N . It lexicographically minimizes the excesses of all coalitions in F the complements of which are also in F , and then lexicographically maximizes the remaining excesses so that they are non-positive (thereby keeping the idea that players should take the maximum of their subordinates, while guaranteeing minimal losses if any). Lastly, we study the prekernel. A simple consideration shows that the classical definition of the prekernel leads to an empty set as soon as F = 2 N . We propose therefore to study the positive prekernel instead (Sudhölter and Peleg 2000) , which contains the positive core. We show that it is characterized by NE, anonymity (AN), REAS, a weak RGP property, CRGP, and weak unanimity for 2-persons games (WUTPG).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic material on partially ordered sets, the core, and the bounded core of games with precedence constraints. Section 3 introduces the positive core, which is axiomatized in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the bounded positive core and introduces the prenucleolus, for which a Kohlberg-like criterion is given. The positive prekernel and its axiomatization are addressed in Section 6, and Section 7 studies the logical independence of all the axioms introduced in the various axiomatizations.
Notation, Definitions, and Preliminaries
A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair (P, ) such that P is a nonempty finite set and is a partial order on P , i.e., a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on P . As usual, we write x y for (x, y) ∈ and use x ≺ y if x y and x = y. If x ≺ y and there is no z ∈ P such that x ≺ z ≺ y then y covers x, denoted by x ≺· y. A chain in (P, ) is a sequence (x 0 , . . . , x q ) such that x 0 ≺ · · · ≺ x q where q is called the length of the chain. The height of a poset is the length of a longest chain. The height of
x ∈ P , denoted by h(x), is the maximal length of a chain from a minimal element to x.
Let U , |U | 3, be a set, the universe of players. A coalition is a finite nonempty subset of U . Let N be a coalition and (N, ) be a poset. Then S ⊆ N is a downset of (N, ) if i ∈ S and j i implies j ∈ S. Denote by O(N, ) the set of downsets of (N, ). Note that (O(N, ), ⊆) is a distributive lattice of height 1 |N |. By Birkhoff's representation theorem the opposite statement is also true: If F ⊆ 2 N and (F , ⊆) is a distributive lattice of height |N |, then there exists a poset (N, ) such that F = O(N, ).
A (cooperative TU) game with precedence constraints (see Faigle and Kern (1992) ) is a triple (N, , v) such that N is a coalition, (N, ) is a poset, and v :
where (N, ) is the poset of height 0. Let Γ denote the set of TU games with precedence constraints.
Throughout this section let (N, , v) be a game with precedence constraints and denote F = O(N, ).
Let
denote the set of feasible and Pareto efficient feasible payoffs (preimputations), respectively. We use
x(S) = i∈S x i (x(∅) = 0) for every S ∈ 2 N and every x ∈ R N as a convention. Additionally, x S denotes the restriction of x to S, i.e. x S = (x i ) i∈S , and we write x = (x S , x N \S ).
The core of (N, , v), denoted by C(N, , v), is defined by
By its definition, the core of (N, , v) is a convex polyhedral set. It is well known (see Derks and Gilles (1995) ) that it does not contain lines. More precisely,
where "conv" means "convex hull", "ext" means "set of extreme points", and "+" denotes "Minkowski sum". For any S ⊆ N, let N χ S = χ S ∈ R N be the indicator function of S, i,e. χ S i = 1 for i ∈ S and χ S j = 0 for j ∈ N \ S. If (N, , v) is a classical game, i.e., if the height of (N, ) is 0, then C(N, , 0) = {0}.
Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a pair (i, j) ∈ N such that i ≺ j, then (see Derks and Gilles (1995) )
where "cone" denotes "convex cone generated by". For i ≺ j, say i = i 0 ≺· · · · ≺· i k = j,
(also shown by Tomizawa (1983) , see also Fujishige (2005, Th. 3.26) ).
The bounded core of (N, , v), denoted by C b (N, , v), is the set of all elements x ∈ C(N, , v) that satisfy the following condition for any i, j ∈ N with i ≺· j: There is no ε > 0 such that
Therefore, if (N, , v) is a classical game, the bounded core coincides with the classical core.
Remark 2.1 According to Rockafellar (1970, Section 18) a closed convex set is the disjoint union of the relative interiors of its faces. Hence, any element of C b (N, , v) is in the interior of some face of C(N, , v). We conclude that C b (N, , v) is the disjoint union of the relative interiors of the bounded faces of C(N, , v), i.e., C b (N, , v) is the union of all bounded faces of C(N, , v). Thus, the bounded core is connected.
The bounded core may be non-convex and, hence, a proper subset of the convex hull of the extreme points of the core (called "convex part of the core") even if the poset is connected as Example 2.2 shows.
We say that i, j ∈ S ⊆ N are connected in (S, ) if there is a path in S that connects i and j, that is, if there exist k ∈ N and i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ N such that i = i 1 , j = i k , and, for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1, either One can show that the vertices of C b (N, , v) are (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), (6, 6, 0, 0) and (3, 3, 3, 3). Then, the bounded core is the union of the three segments between (3, 3, 3, 3) and each of the vertices (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), and (6, 6, 0, 0). Indeed, any point in the segment between (3, 3, 3, 3) and (0, 6, 6, 0) has the form (3α, −3α+6, −3α+6, 3α), and any transfer ε(χ {4} −χ {i} ) for i ≺ 4 would lead to a point outside the core.
The same conclusion holds for the two other segments by symmetry. Now, consider the point (3, 3, 5, 1), which is the midpoint of (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0) and (3, 3, 3, 3) . Observe that a transfer (0, 0, −2, 2) on this point would give (3, 3, 3, 3) ∈ C(N, , v), hence it does not belong to the bounded core. By symmetry again, any point in the relative interior of the convex hull of (3, 3, 3, 3) and any two of the vertices (0, 6, 6, 0), (6, 0, 6, 0), and (6, 6, 0, 0) is outside the bounded core.
For any S ∈ F and x ∈ R N , let e(S, x, v) = v(S) − x(S) be the excess at x.
For any α ∈ R the α-core of (N, , v), denoted by C α (N, , v) , is the set
The following lemma follows from Lemma 3.2 of Grabisch and Sudhölter (2012) . Let (N, * ) be the reverse partially ordered set (i.e., i * j iff j i). Note that O(N,
As for classical games, if
x ∈ X(N, v) and S ∈ O(N, * ), then
In order to generalize Lemma 2.3 to games that do not necessarily have a connected hierarchy, we define the intermediate game (see Owen (1977) for a similar construction) of (N, , v) as follows. Denote by R (N, ) = R the partition of N whose elements are the connected components of N . In the present context R is considered as natural set of "a priori unions" and not a "coalition structure"à la Aumann and Drèze Proposition 2.4 For any game (N, , v) with precedence constraints, any preimputation y of the intermediate game (R, v R ), and any α ∈ R,
. To show non-emptiness we construct the components of
Hence
The observation that z(Q) = 0 for any z ∈ C(N, , 0) and any Q ∈ R implies the second statement of the proposition. q.e.d.
Note that for any y ∈ X (R, v R ),
3 The positive core
In order to expand the definition of the positive core (Orshan and Sudhölter 2010) to TU games with precedence constraints, we employ and recall Justman's (1977) notion of the "generalized nucleolus" (Schmeidler 1969) .
Let D be a finite nonempty set, X be a set, let h : X → R D , and denote d := |D|. Define θ :
that is, for any x ∈ X, θ(x) is the vector, whose components are the numbers
Then the positive core of (N, , v), denoted by C + (N, , v), is defined by , v) . Then x ∈ X(N, v) (otherwise there are positive excesses and all of them could be diminished) and, e(S, x, v) 0 for all S ∈ F 0 (otherwise, if e(S, x, v) > 0 for some S ∈ F 0 , then there exist ℓ ∈ S ∋ k, k ≺· ℓ, and one could diminish this excess and the excesses of all S ′ ∈ F 0 , ℓ ∈ S ′ ∋ k, by a transfer t(χ {k} − χ {ℓ} ), t > 0, without changing the excesses of further coalitions). We conclude that
It is well-known that for a classical TU game (N, v) the prenucleolus, i.e., the set
consists of a single element ν(N, v) (the prenucleolus point) and that
and we may define the bounded positive core by
Remark 3.1 The variant of the " Kohlberg (1971) criterion" for the positive core of classical games is
, then following statements are equivalent (Orshan and Sudhölter 2010, Theorem 3.4 ):
We also note that the definitions of the classical bargaining set and its variants use the notion of "individual" objections. In a TU game (N, , v) with precedence constraints a player ℓ ∈ N has no objection against any of her subordinates k ≺ ℓ so that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler pre-bargaining set Maschler 1964, Davis and Maschler 1967) , the reactive pre-bargaining set (Granot 1994) , and the However, the positive core is a subset of any of the mentioned pre-bargaining sets.
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On classical games the prenucleolus and the positive core are the unique solutions that satisfy a collection of plausible properties. In this section we show that the positive core on the set of TU games with precedence constraints is characterized by these axioms.
We first recall the mentioned axioms of a solution. Let F = O(N, ) wherever it occurs in this section.
(4.1)
The permutation π is a symmetry of (N,
Let SYM(N, , v) denote the set of symmetries.
A solution is a mapping σ that assigns a subset σ(N, , v) of X * (N, v) to any (N, , v) ∈ Γ. Its restriction to a set Γ ′ ⊆ Γ is again denoted by σ. Moreover, a solution on Γ ′ is the restriction to Γ ′ of some solution.
A solution σ on Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies
• Covariance under strategic equivalence (COV) if, for all (N, , v) , (N, , w) ∈ Γ ′ , α > 0, and β ∈ R N , the following holds: If w(S) = αv(S) + β(S) for all S ∈ F, then σ(N, , w) = ασ(N, , v) + β;
• Anonymity (AN) if, for all (N, , v) ∈ Γ ′ and all injective mappings π : N → U the following
• reasonableness (REAS) if, for all (N, , v) ∈ Γ ′ and all x ∈ σ(N, , v) the following property holds for each minimal element k and each maximal element ℓ in N :
• reduced game property (RGP) if the following condition holds:
• reconfirmation property (RCP) if the following condition holds for every (N, , v) ∈ Γ ′ , every 
For classical TU games, the foregoing set is nonempty because it contains the prenucleous point.
Hence, by Proposition 2.4 it is also nonempty in the general case so that it indeed coincides with the relative interior of the positive core.
(2) Note that C + satisfies REAS. Indeed, let (N, , v) ∈ Γ, x ∈ X(N, v), and k, ℓ ∈ N such that k is minimal and ℓ is maximal. If x k < t : (N, , v) . Similarly it is shown that
(3) It is straightforward to verify that C + on any Γ ′ ⊆ Γ satisfies NE, PO, COV, AN, and CLOS.
We say that Γ ′ ⊆ Γ is closed under reduction if, for all (N, , v) ∈ Γ ′ , ∅ = S ⊆ N, and x ∈ X(N, v),
(1) If Γ ′ is closed under reduction, then both C + and rint C + on Γ ′ satisfy RGP.
2 When cooperation is not restricted, i.e., all coalitions are feasible, we call a game unrestricted (free).
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(2) Both C + and rint C + on Γ ′ satisfy RCP.
Proof: For C + , Remark 3.1 (3.5) implies (see Theorem 6.3.14 of Peleg and Sudhölter 2007) RGP, and in order to show RCP the relevant part of the proof of Theorem 6.3.14 of RCP may be literally copied.
In the case of rint C + we may proceed similarly as before to show RGP. The "Kohlberg criterion" has to be modified only inasmuch as α > 0 has to be replaced by α 0 in (3.5) and (3.6).
In order to show that rint C + satisfies RCP, let (N, Proof: Let S ⊆ N such that |Q∩S| = 1 for all Q ∈ R. For any i ∈ S denote Q i the connected component that contains i. Hence, the mapping S → R, i → Q i for all i ∈ S, is a bijection. As F (S) = 2 S , by RGP and our assumption, x S ∈ C + (S, , v S,x ). Now, let y ∈ R R be defined by y Q = x ( Q) for all Q ∈ R.
Then, for any T ⊆ S, e(T,
for some P ⊆ N \ S such that T ∪ P ∈ F . If e(T, x S , v S,x ) > 0 then T ∪ P must be a union of connected components, hence T ∪ P = i∈T Q i so that the foregoing equation is valid. Conversely, if
By Remark 3.1 (3.5), y ∈ C + (R, v R ). The proof is finished by (3.1). q.e.d.
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Theorem 4.6 Assume that |U | = ∞. There is a unique solution that satisfies NE, REAS, COV, CLOS, RGP, RCP, and ND, and it is the positive core.
Proof: The positive core satisfies the desired axioms by Remark 4.1, Lemma 4.2, and Lemma 4.3.
In order to show the remaining direction, let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired axioms. On Γ free , σ must be one of the following three solutions (Orshan and Sudhölter 2010, Theorem 4.1): The prenucleolus, the positive core, or its relative interior. Hence, σ is a subsolution of the positive core by Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5.
Step 1: We claim that, on Γ free , σ is the positive core. In order to show this statement it suffices to As
in the definition of scale COV). By CLOS, (0, 0) ∈ σ(R, ′ , 0) so that by translation COV and RCP, z = (0, 1, 1) ∈ σ(M ′ , ′ , u ′ ). Finally, RGP yields that (0, 1) ∈ σ(P, u ′ P,z ) and (0, 1) ∈ C + (P, u ′ P,z ) \ rint C + (P, u ′ P,z ).
Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ. It remains to show that
Step 1 we may assume that F = 2 N .
Step 2: We consider the case |N | = 2 first and assume without loss of generality that N = {1, 2} and 1 ≺ 2. By COV we may assume that v(S) = 0 for all S ∈ F. With (M ′ , ′ , u ′ ) defined in Step 1, by NE there exists y ∈ σ(M ′ , ′ , u ′ ). As in Step 1 we may assume that y 3 = 1. By RGP and RCP applied to R, we may assume that y 2 0. Furthermore, by RGP and RCP applied to P , we may replace (y 1 , y 3 ) by (y 1 + y 3 , 0) ( or by (0, y 1 + y 3 ) if necessary because σ(P, u ′ P,y ) = C + (P, u ′ P,y )). Thus, there exists z, z ′ ∈ σ(M ′ , ′ , u ′ ) with z 1 > 0 and z ′ 1 = 0. By RGP and COV, (z 1 , −z 1 ), (0, 0) ∈ σ(N, , v) so that by scale covariance, (t, −t) ∈ σ(N, , v) for all t 0, i.e., σ(N, , v) = C + (N, , v) . Now the proof of (4.3) can be finished by induction on |N |. For |N | = 1, C + (N, , v) is a singleton so that (N, , v) . Similarly, if y ∈ σ(N, , v), then by RCP applied to {k, ℓ}, we may replace y k by y k + t and y ℓ by y ℓ − t and receive another element of σ (N, , v) . Also, by applying RCP to the coalition N ′ = N \ {k}, by the the inductive hypothesis, y ′ = (y k , z N ′ ) ∈ σ(N, , v) for any z N ′ ∈ C + (N ′ , , v N ′ ,y ).
By RGP and RCP of
Hence, it remains to show that σ(N, , v) contains an element x such that x k = α. Let x ′ arise from x by replacing x k by y k and x ℓ by x ℓ + x k − y k . Then x ′ ∈ σ(N, , v) as we have shown. Now, applying RCP to {k, ℓ} allows us to reverse this modification so that x ∈ σ(N, , v) .
q.e.d.
Characterizing the bounded positive core
This section is devoted to the characterization of the bounded positive core. Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N, ), and R = R (N, ) . We may rewrite (3.3) as
Note that C b + inherits the following properties from C + : NE, PO, COV, AN, REAS, and CLOS. We now define a particular subsolution of C b + that is single-valued and satisfies ND. Let F * = O(N, * ) where (N, * ) is the reverse order of (N, ). Moreover, denote by ν the prenucleolus of the intermediate game Then X = ∅ because y ∈ X. Therefore N (N, , v) = N UC ((e(S, ·, v * )) S∈F * , X) .
Moreover, X is closed and convex. We now show that X is bounded. For i ∈ N let h(i) the height of i w.r. t. (N, ) . Let x ∈ X. If h(i) = 0, then i ∈ F and, hence, As the excess functions are continuous and convex, and as X is nonempty, compact, and convex, the prenucleolus N UC ((e(S, ·, v * )) S∈F * , X) is a nonempty convex set such that e(S, x, v * ) = e(S, x ′ , v * ) for ∈ N (N, , v) . By induction on h * (i), the height of i w.r.t.
(N, * ) we show that
so that x i = x ′ i by the inductive hypothesis applied to j ∈ S \ {i}. Let ν(N, , v) = ν denote the unique element of N (N, , v) . Moreover, let k, ℓ ∈ N such that k ≺· ℓ. Assume that t = max{e(S, ν, v) | S ∈ F , ℓ / ∈ S ∋ k} < 0. Let 0 < ε < −t and let x ∈ R N only differ from ν inasmuch as x k = ν k − ε and x ℓ = ν ℓ + ε. Then x ∈ X and e(T, x, v * ) < e(T, ν, v * ) for all T ∈ F * such that k / ∈ T ∋ ℓ and e(T, x, v * ) = e(T, ν, v * ) for all other T ∈ F * which is a contradiction. By (5.1), ν ∈ C b + (N, , v) . q.e.d.
Remark 5.2 The solution N (·) satisfies ND because it is single-valued and satisfies AN.
We provide now a combinatorial characterization of the prenucleolus of (N, , v) by a Kohlberg-like criterion. To this end, we introduce the following collections, for any Q ∈ R: is the prenucleolus of (R, v R ). The following are equivalent:
(1) x = N (N, , v) (2) For α > 0, Q ∈ R, y ∈ R Q , with y(Q) = 0 and y(S) 0 for all S ∈ D ′ (α, x, v * , Q) ∪ E(x, v, Q), we have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ D ′ (α, x, v * , Q).
(3) For α > 0 and Q ∈ R, D ′ = D ′ (α, x, v * , Q) is balanced within D ′ ∪ E(x, v, Q).
Proposition 5.3 generalizes Kohlberg's (1971) characterization of the nucleolus. The equivalence between (1) and (2) is proved similarly as in the classical case. The equivalence between (2) and (3) which is an immediate consequence of Farkas' lemma occurs as a special case of Lemma 2.1 of Derks, Peters, and Sudhölter (2014) and is, e.g., explicitly proved by Derks and Peters (1998) . • the unrestricted reconfirmation property (RCP free ) if the restriction of σ to Γ ′ ∩ Γ free satisfies RCP.
RCRGP has not been used in the literature. It may be interpreted as follows. If every "block", i.e., every connected component, may select a representative so that the coalition of representatives S is satisfied with the preimputation x (i.e., x S ∈ σ(S, v S,x )) and if every pair of players consisting of a player ℓ and her immediate subordinate k is also satisfied (i.e., x T ∈ σ(T, , v T,x ), where T = {k, ℓ}), then no player in the grand coalition has an objection against x (i.e., x ∈ σ(N, , v)).
As C + satisfied RCP, C b + satisfies RCP on Γ free , i.e., C b + satisfies RCP free . By (3.3), it also satisfies BOUND.
The following result may be proved similarly to Lemma 4.5. Theorem 5.6 The bounded positive core is the unique solution that satisfies NE, BOUND, COV, RGP, RCP free , ND, and RCRGP, provided |U | = ∞.
We postpone the proof and first show a useful variant of Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 5.7 If σ is a solution that satisfies BOUND, COV, and RGP, then, for any k, ℓ ∈ N such that
Proof: Let u = v P,x . Define y ∈ R P by y k = x k − u({k}) and y ℓ = x ℓ + u({k}) − u(P ). By RGP and translation COV, y ∈ σ(P, , 0). By scale COV, ty ∈ σ(P, , 0) for t > 0 so that, by BOUND, y = 0,
Proof of Theorem 5.6: It remains to show the uniqueness part. Let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired properties. By Lemmas 5.7 and 4.5, σ is a subsolution of C b + . Thus, it remains to show that
Claim: The solution σ coincides with
Hence, our claim is valid by Remark 5.5 in any case. Now we can finish the proof. Let x ∈ C b + (N, , v) and choose any S ⊆ N such that |S ∩ Q| = 1 for any Q ∈ R (N, ) . Then (S, ) has height 0 so that the reduced game w.r.t. S belongs to Γ free . By RGP of C b + , x S ∈ C + (S, v S,x ). Hence, by our claim x S ∈ σ(S, v S,x ). Moreover, if k, ℓ ∈ N satisfy k ≺· ℓ, then ({k, ℓ}, , v {k,ℓ},x ) has a single-valued bounded (positive) core by (5.1). By RGP of C b + , the unique element is (x k , x ℓ ), i.e., x k = v {k,ℓ},x ({k}). Hence, (x k , x ℓ ) ∈ σ ({k, ℓ}, , v {k,ℓ},x ) by NE of σ. By RCRGP,
Remark 5.8 Assume that |U | = ∞. According to Sobolev (1975) , the prenucleolus is the unique solution on Γ free that satisfies SIVA, AN, COV, and RGP. For a single-valued solution, however, RGP is equivalent to RCP. Moreover, Orshan (1993) showed that AN may be replaced by the equal treatment property, and Orshan and Sudhölter (2003) proved that the four axioms may be replaced by NE, ETP, COV, and RCP. However, a nonempty solution on Γ that contains the prenucleolus for unrestricted games and satisfies RGP or RCP and COV, cannot coincide with the prenucleolus on Γ free as an easy analysis of the reduced games of (M ′ , ′ , u ′ ) (the game used in the proofs of the characterizations) shows. Hence, in the foregoing sense there is no "prenucleolus" on Γ.
Characterizing the positive prekernel and its bounded variant
This section is devoted to generalize the definition and characterization (Sudhölter and Peleg 2000) of the positive prekernel to games with precedence constraints. Let (N, , v) ∈ Γ, F = O(N, ), and R = R (N, ) . For x ∈ R N and k, ℓ ∈ N, k = ℓ, denote by s kℓ (x, v) the maximum surplus of k over ℓ at x, defined by
The positive prekernel of (N, , v) is the set
If the height of (N, ) is not 0, i.e., if restrictions are present, then the prekernel (an element x of which, similarly as in (6.1), has to satisfy s kℓ (
Thus, we define the bounded positive prekernel by We now show that the result mentioned in Remark 6.1 may be generalized to Γ. A solution σ on (N, , v) is a singleton whenever |N | = 2 and (N, ) has not height 0. Hence, we note that the bounded positive prekernel is characterized by NE, AN, REAS, WRGP, CRGP, WUTPG free (requiring that the core is contained in the solution applied to any classical 2-person game), and BOUND.
Here, REAS cannot be deleted. Indeed, let t > 0 and, define the following solution σ by the requirement x, v) ) + for all k, ℓ ∈ N, k = ℓ, and max i∈S ∋j,S∈F e(S, x, v) = 0 for all i, j ∈ N, i ≺ j, and v(N ) − t x(N ) v(N ), then PK b + is a subsolution of σ that, hence, satisfies NE and WUTPG free . Also, it satisfies BOUND and AN and the remaining properties (WRGP and CRGP) are easily deduced as well. However, σ does not coincide with PK b + already for 1-person games.
7 On the logical independence of the employed axioms By generalizing or slightly modifying the solution concepts σ 1 , . . . , σ 5 of Orshan and Sudhölter (2010, Sect. 4 .1), we will show that each of the axioms (1) Then it is easy to check that σ i satisfies all axioms from (1) to (5) except (i), for all i = 1, . . . , 5, and similarly for σ ib and the bounded version of the axioms. Also, as mentioned, rint C + satisfies all axioms of Theorem 4.6 except CLOS. The solutions σ 1 and σ 1b , respectively, also show that NE is logically independent in the characterization of the positive prekernel (Proposition 6.1) and its bounded variant.
Similarly, the (bounded) positive core has all properties except CRGP and the correspondence X only violates REAS in Proposition 6.2. The solution that assigns the positive prekernel to each (N, , v) with As in the classical case, σ 6 (respectively, σ 6b ) satisfies NE, REAS (respectively, BOUND), RGP, CRGP, and WUTPG (respectively, WUTPG free ); and it violates AN.
Let t > 0 and We don't know if ND is logically independent of the remaining axioms in the characterizing result of the (bounded) positive core. We remark that NE is logically independent of NE, REAS (BOUND), COV, and RGP on Γ free (Orshan and Sudhölter 2010), i.e., there are solutions that satisfy NE, REAS, COV, and RGP, and do neither coincide with the prenucleolus nor with the positive core or its relative interior.
But as soon as an axiom is added that guarantees that the positive core is the only solution that has also this property, then it is an open problem whether or not ND is still needed.
Moreover, we have to admit that we don't know whether RCRGP is logically independent of the remaining axioms in Theorem 5.6.
Finally, examples of the mentioned paper may be generalized to show that the infinity assumption on |U | is necessary in the characterization of the (bounded) positive core and that for |U | = 2 the statement of Proposition 6.2 is no longer valid.
